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CHAPTER 1.  
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Research Topic: Corporate Political Activity and the Business-Government 
Interface 
 
Although the economic marketplace is commonly envisaged as the arena for competition, 
firms will often contend with considerable rivalry on its fringes. These so-called 
‘nonmarket’ frontiers of the firm encompass the broad array of organizational interactions 
that are not mediated by private agreements or contracts (Baron, 1995). They are also where 
firms are likely to encounter most resistance to their economic objectives (Markman, 
Waldron & Panagopoulos, 2016).  
Scholarly interest in how firms are influenced by, and attempt to influence, their 
nonmarket environment has largely developed along two parallel strands of research. The 
first, comprising the literature on strategic corporate social responsibility, focuses on 
corporate actions that aim to promote some social good while simultaneously enabling the 
organization to enhance its profits (Baron, 2001; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). The 
second strand, comprising the literature on Corporate Political Activity (CPA), focuses 
specifically on the business-government interface and examines the various ways in 
Chapter 1 
 2 
which firms try to shape public policy, with the aim of protecting and advancing their 
economic interests (Getz, 1997). This dissertation focuses on this second strand of research 
and investigates how firms -as represented by their managers and shareholders- perceive 
and attempt to manage their relationship with the state and its political representatives 
(henceforth, ‘politicians’). 
 Before delving into the various manifestations of CPA, it is important to first ask 
why firms would wish to expend resources into establishing and maintaining favorable 
relationships with the state. As the legitimate holder of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power, the state maintains the legal authority to develop, execute, and adjudicate over all 
matters of public policy. Politicians routinely draft, amend, decide upon, and implement 
legislation that has direct consequences for business. As such, politicians intent on favoring 
specific firms or industries may provide the latter with preferential access to state-controlled 
resources in the form of governmental subsidies, favorable taxation regimes, or lucrative 
public procurement contracts, for example (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2018; 
Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013). Politicians can additionally provide favored firms with 
protection by stalling regulations that harm their interests (Lux, Crook & Leap, 2012), or by 
displaying leniency when those firms engage in wrongdoing (Correia, 2014). They can also 
help firms guard market share by fending off competition from current rivals (Capron & 
Chatain, 2008) and by raising barriers to market access for foreign entrants and radical 
disruptors (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Even without tangibly shaping the 
development of policy, politicians can offer favored firms a window on the ‘inner workings 
of government’ that puts them at an advantage relative to their uninformed counterparts 
(Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Jr, 2008). 
There is ample evidence that firms and their managers are aware of the potential 
value to be accrued from political activity. Around the world, firms have been shown to 
engage in various forms of CPA, ranging from lobbying and campaign contributions, to the 
hiring of politicians as members of the board (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In 2012 alone, 3,587 
firms in the US spent a total of $1.84 billion on lobbying public officials, with 372 firms 
spending more than $1 million each (Drutman, 2015). It is important to note that these 
lobbying expenditures are distinct from the campaign contributions that firms also make to 
federal candidates through their Political Action Committees or PACs, and which amounted 
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to an additional $170 million in 2012 (Center for Responsive Politics). That firms are 
prohibited from financing elected officials in other parts of the world, has not stifled the 
intensity of CPA there but has led instead to the rise of alternative strategies for attaining 
political influence. For example, the ‘revolving-door’ phenomenon, or the movement of 
individuals between positions in the public and private sectors, has been particularly 
prevalent in the EU. According to Transparency International, more than 30% of former 
Members of European Parliament and 50% of former EU Commissioners accepted 
employment in companies that had actively lobbied EU institutions before (Freund & 
Bendel, 2017).  
The engagement of firms in political activity has not gone unnoticed, however. The 
notion of ‘money in politics’ is a topic that has and continues to generate significant societal 
interest, particularly around politically-sensitive periods such as elections or the formation 
of governments, when organized interest groups are eager to influence the ideological 
makeup of the incoming executive or legislature. Among academics, interest in the business-
government interface has spanned a number of disciplines. Political scientists tend to view 
public policy outcomes as a function of interest group competition, which business -as a 
monolithic group- often dominates to the detriment of public interest and democratic process 
(Epstein, 1980; Salisbury, 1984). In industrial-organization economics, the primary focus 
has been on the inducements and challenges of collective political action given that policy 
outcomes are predominantly conceptualized at the industry-level (Esty & Caves, 1983; 
Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971). Within the management literature, CPA is conventionally 
understood to be a strategic investment -or real option- that can supplement firms’ market 
capabilities (Baron, 1995; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). 
More concretely, scholarly work in the strategic management literature on CPA has 
tended to focus on three broad research areas. First, scholars have tried to unravel the factors 
that lead certain firms to engage in politics, as well as the extent to which they do so 
(Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 
2011). One of the primary insights from this line of inquiry is that because political 
engagement does not constitute a core competence for the majority of firms around the 
world, firms that are especially dependent on government- i.e. those operating in highly 
regulated industries, or those who have governmental agencies as major customers– have 
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more to gain from maintaining favorable relations with the state, and are thus are more likely 
to engage in CPA (Hillman et al., 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In essence, this strand of 
research portrays CPA as a deliberate attempt by firms to strategically manage their 
dependence on government.  
Recent research has suggested, however, that our understanding of the antecedents 
of CPA may benefit from further nuance. For example, recent meta-analyses have cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of CPA at influencing public policy in well-functioning democracies 
(Hadani, Bonardi, & Dahan, 2017), which begs the question why regulated firms would 
invest in CPA if their chances of success are modest at best? To quote Ansolabehere et al. 
(2003)’s response to economist Gordon’s Tullock puzzle regarding why firms in the US do 
not invest more in campaign contributions: “the question is not why there is so little money 
in politics, but rather why organized interests [i.e. firms] give at all”? Such findings have 
prompted scholars to begin considering additional factors that might drive CPA, like the 
political ideology of the firm’s top management (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013), the 
inclination of the firm’s controlling owners to appropriate wealth  (Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 
2016), and the firm’s broader dependencies transcending the political domain (Hadani, Doh, 
& Schneider, 2016). 
A second group of CPA studies has pursued the highly elusive but important 
question of whether engaging in politics ultimately affects firm performance, and if so, in 
what direction? Within this area, findings are markedly mixed. Studies have thus far 
documented positive (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Fisman, 2001; Goldman, 
Rocholl, & So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2008), negative (Aggarwal, Meschke, & Wang, 
2012; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Siegel, 2007), and 
insignificant (Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Ueda, 2004; Faccio, 2006) effects of CPA on firm 
performance, irrespective of how performance is measured or operationalized. Although a 
host of arguments have been proposed to explain both the value-enhancing and value-
destroying facets of CPA (e.g. Hadani & Schuler, 2013), it remains unclear what ultimately 
determines the net value that firms will accrue from engaging in politics given that the 
potential benefits and risks of CPA are likely to coexist at any point in time (Okmatovskiy, 
2010). This ambiguity has prompted scholarly calls for further research into the contingent 
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consequences of CPA, though much of this work remains of a conceptual nature (e.g. 
Lawton, Mcguire, & Rajwani, 2013; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). 
A final strand of research focuses on the institutional context in which CPA takes 
place (Doh, Lawton & Rajwani, 2012). Institutions, or the ‘rules of the game’ that condition 
human relations and govern political and economic interactions, are designed to reduce the 
uncertainty associated with exchange (North, 1991). Yet, institutions vary in their degree of 
completeness and impartiality towards the actors that they are supposed to govern (White 
III, Boddewyn & Galang, 2015). As such, institutions differentially determine the degree to 
which firms can readily rely on political action to create market value, but also the extent to 
which this value will be subsequently appropriated (Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017).  
Although many studies within this stream have pointed to the various structural 
characteristics of the political environment that influence the antecedents, strategies, and 
outcomes of CPA (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2005; Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden Bergh, 2006; 
Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2014; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Kozhikode & Li, 2012), our 
understanding of the international variation of the business-government interface remains 
relatively limited however (Hillman & Keim, 1995). Specifically, because much of the 
extant literature has focused on single-country contexts, namely the US and China, there is 
a notable dearth of comparative studies on how specific political tactics are differentially 
employed across countries (e.g. Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005), and how these 
tactics differentially contribute to firm performance.1 An understanding of CPA that is 
detached from the institutional context is in turn problematic because it can lead scholars to 
inadvertently infect findings and theoretical lessons learnt with country-specific biases (Cui, 
Hu, Li & Meyer, 2018), or to adopt a generic view of the business-government interface 
across all countries at similar levels of institutional development (Jackson & Deeg, 2008) or 
with similar types of political regimes (Marquis & Raynard, 2015).  
In this dissertation, I aim to contribute to all three aforementioned strands of CPA 
research by tackling the following overarching research question: How is the business-
government interface differentially perceived and managed by firms and their stakeholders 
                                                 
1 The shortage of comparative work in CPA may be attributable in large part to institutional restrictions that 
prohibit certain forms of CPA (such as campaign financing) in some countries but not others, thus limiting the 
scope for cross-country studies. Lax disclosure requirements additionally present researchers with data 
availability challenges in certain parts of the world. Unlike the US, for example, corporate disclosure of lobbying 
expenditures is currently voluntary when lobbying EU institutions. 
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across institutional contexts? In addressing this question, I seek to contribute, first, to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the antecedents of CPA. I do so by arguing and showing 
that the appointment of politicians on the board, an exemplary political strategy in the 
literature, can also serve as a strategic corporate response to external threats that do not 
emanate directly from the firm’s political environment. Second, I seek to forward a finer-
grained, contingent view of CPA value. I do so by examining the conditions under which 
investors across 14 economically-developed countries expect firms to benefit from the 
appointment of politicians to the board, as well as the conditions that simultaneously cause 
them to be apprehensive of the risks associated with these political connections. In doing so, 
I demonstrate that the net value of this specific political strategy is contingent on attributes 
of the appointing firm as well as on the institutional context in which it takes place. Third, I 
advance a more nuanced understanding of the business-government interface in institutional 
environments wherein conventional forms of CPA may not be readily available for firms, 
as when an incumbent government is expected to depart imminently but the identity of the 
new regime is not yet known. Specifically, my final contribution lies in forwarding new 
insights on ‘interim governments’-- that is, when an authoritarian status quo has clearly been 
rejected, but a democratic ‘new normal’ is yet to be established. While most of the extant 
literature on the business-government interface addresses conventional forms of 
government— i.e. democracies and autocracies-- we know very little of how this interface 
evolves when the ‘rules of the game’ are temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath 
of a revolution or coup.  
Having provided a glimpse of how this dissertation fits within the broader body of 
research on CPA and the business-government interface,2 I now shift to the theoretical 
underpinnings of my research. In the next section, I briefly review the main theoretical 
perspectives used in the CPA literature, before highlighting how the three studies that make 
up this dissertation contribute to the advancement of theory in the field.     
 
                                                 
2 Throughout this introductory chapter I refer to ‘Corporate Political Activity’ (CPA) and the ‘business-government 
interface’ interchangeably to account for the broad nature of the research agenda underlying this dissertation. There 
are of course differences between both terms. Whereas the business-government interface refers to the generic 
interactions and interdependencies between the private and public sectors (Hillman & Keim, 1995), CPA refers to 
the strategic manner in which firms deliberately attempt to manage these interactions (Getz, 1997). In essence 
however, both concepts are premised on the perception of the state as a primary stakeholder of the firm-- that is, a 
critical provider of firm resources that also stands to be affected by firm behavior. 
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1.2 Theoretical Background 
 
1.2.1 Corporate Political Activity 
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) is formally defined as “any deliberate firm action 
intended to influence governmental policy or process” (Getz, 1997 p. 32). CPA is strategic, 
in that it is planned, enacted, and evaluated on the basis of “maximizing economic returns 
from the political environment” (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008, p. 496). CPA is also highly 
versatile; it takes different forms, targets different centers of political power, and strives for 
diverse outcomes that are loosely related to public policy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). At times, 
firms may engage in CPA in response to the emergence of a policy issue that jeopardizes 
the viability of firm operations. At other times, firms proactively engage in CPA with the 
aim of establishing a continued exchange relationship with policymakers that serves as real 
option, to be resorted to at times of need. Firms may engage in CPA individually, often with 
the express aim of attaining firm-specific benefits that they would not be required to share 
among industry peers. Other times, when confronted with highly salient and polarizing 
issues, firms will pool their political efforts through an overarching industry or trade 
association to share costs and to reduce the reputational liability associated with taking an 
unpopular position. CPA strategies themselves may vary based on the resources that firms 
are willing to trade in return for favorable public policy. When policymakers lack 
informational resources to adopt a clear policy stance, firms may engage in active lobbying 
in an attempt to position the firm’s position as the desirable choice. On the other hand, when 
policymakers are in particular need of financial resources to fund their election campaigns 
or their post-politics careers, firms may make campaign contributions3 or invite these 
politicians to serve as directors on their boards. Finally, firms may avoid direct interactions 
with politicians altogether, targeting instead their voting constituents in order to sway public 
opinion towards industry- or firm-friendly policy.               
                                                 
3 Corporations and unions in the United States are generally prohibited from directly financing federal candidates. 
Nevertheless, firms can contribute to politicians and political parties indirectly through independent expenditure-
only political committees (also known as SuperPACs), and/or via their managers and shareholders through 
Political Action Committees (PACs). At state-level, direct corporate contributions to candidates/parties are 
permissible in many states.  
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 Within the management literature, scholars have conventionally relied on a subset 
of theories to probe the motivation of firms to engage in CPA, their choice of political 
strategies and tactics, as well as their ability to effectively implement CPA and reap its 
benefits (Table 1.1). The primary theoretical lens underlying the bulk of this research is 
resource dependence theory (RDT) (Hillman et al., 2004; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 
2016). RDT is premised on the notion that firms’ reliance on external resources creates 
important sources of uncertainty that, if left unmanaged, can endanger firm performance and 
survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to this view, it is imperative that firms 
actively manage their dependence on external parties in order to enhance their autonomy, to 
buffer against environmental fluctuations, and to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
external exchange (Davis & Cobb, 2010).  
In general, firms can remedy their external dependencies in two ways. First, they 
may attempt to align the interests of key resource providers with the firm’s own interests 
through absorption and co-optation. Alternatively, they may opt to reduce or eliminate this 
dependence altogether by internalizing the activities of the resource-controlling 
organization, or by diversifying the set of resource providers on whom the firm depends 
(Drees & Heugens, 2013). For example, a car manufacturer wary of its dependence on a sole 
supplier for its brakes may attempt to reduce the risks of this dependence by acquiring the 
brake supplier, by providing the supplier with an ownership stake in the firm, by 
manufacturing the brakes in-house, or by contracting with several brake suppliers 
simultaneously.  
The core premise of RDT as applied to CPA research is that firms are dependent 
on the state for resources such as public policy and political legitimacy (Hillman, Withers 
& Collins, 2009). Because the state is neither absorbable nor easily replaceable, an RDT-
based understanding of CPA posits that political engagement constitutes an effective 
mechanism through which firms build stronger connections with the state to buffer against 
resource volatility (i.e. mitigate the risk of unfavorable regulatory developments) and to 
advance firm interest (i.e. promote the development of firm-friendly policy). For similar 
reasons, RDT posits that greater dependence on government further incentivizes firms to 
engage in politics (Hillman, 2005). As insightful as a resource dependence theoretic 
understanding of CPA is however, some scholars have critiqued it for its relative inability  
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to account for the costs associated with CPA (Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Sun et al., 2016),  or 
to convincingly explain why dependence on government does not guarantee the 
effectiveness of subsequent CPA efforts (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Other scholars have 
emphasized the need to complement RDT with insights from other theories in order to arrive 
at a more comprehensive understanding of CPA (Hillman et al., 2009).  
It is in this spirit that I have set out to propose through this dissertation a more 
nuanced and finer grained conceptualization of CPA, beginning with the question of why 
firms actually engage in CPA, and ending with an examination of its consequences as 
perceived by the firm’s most important stakeholders: its (actual and potential) shareholders. 
To do so, I infuse the RDT-based understanding of CPA with research from other streams 
of literature. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of these streams and discuss how 
they relate to my overall research agenda. 
 
1.2.2 The Corporate Governance Role of Boards of Directors 
Among the plethora of strategies that firms can embrace to participate in politics, many firms 
around the world choose to appoint current or former politicians -including regulators, 
elected officials, senior civil servants- on their board of directors. In most developed and 
developing countries, firms face minimal restrictions on such appointments, making them a 
particularly useful political strategy to examine in a comparative setting (Faccio, 2006). In 
this dissertation, I focus exclusively on politician appointments as an exemplary CPA 
strategy that firms employ to establish a strong relationship with policymakers and to 
remedy their political dependencies (Hillman, 2005). However, because politicians serve as 
directors on the firm’s board, their appointment also has implications on the governance of 
the firm. An examination of the corporate governance literature is thus warranted.  
 Within the corporate governance literature, directors on the board are assumed to 
perform two distinct functions. First, directors monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders to ensure that the interests of the latter are being served (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Second, directors act as providers of valuable firm resources, which range from the 
provision of strategic counsel and advice to management, to the brokering of ties with 
important outside constituencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A sizeable body of corporate 
governance research has investigated the conditions under which directors are able and 
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willing to perform either or both functions simultaneously (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Director-centric research, for example, has identified directors’ human and social capital, 
identity, and moral and ideological compass as underlying causes of their differential 
capacity and intrinsic motivation to fulfill their duties (Gupta & Wowak, 2017; Hambrick, 
Misangyi, Park, 2015; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013). Other research has established 
the firm’s dependencies as a strong predictor of which function(s) directors will focus on 
following their appointment (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).        
 In the context of politician-directors specifically, incorporating insights from the 
corporate governance literature can complement our resource dependence theoretic 
understanding of CPA in two ways. First, there are insights highlighting the need to broaden 
the RDT-based conceptualization of politician-directors as providers of exclusively political 
resources. Certo (2003) and others, for example, argue that the appointment of resource-rich 
or prestigious directors signals organizational legitimacy and quality to third parties, such 
as providers of capital (Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014). In other research, politician-
directors have been identified as ‘stakeholder directors’—that is, individuals with strong ties 
to societal stakeholders (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, Keim & Luce, 2001; 
Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002), suggesting that their appointment by the firm may at times be 
aimed at community-based, rather than governmental-based, pressures (Chesky, 2016). 
Second, because RDT emphasizes the resource-provisionary role of directors, other 
theoretical lenses such as agency theory may be more suitable for examining the ‘darker’ 
side of these appointments (Sun, Hu & Hillman, 2016). Thus, in this dissertation, I 
incorporate both perspectives to argue that politician appointments may (a) constitute 
generic dependence-management strategies aimed at securing relational capital from a broad 
set of stakeholders, and (b) generate non-negligible costs that may at times outweigh the 
potential benefits they produce. 
  
1.2.3 A Behavioral Perspective on Investor Reactions 
Establishing a causal relationship between political strategies and firm-relevant outcomes 
constitutes one of the major challenges in CPA research (Hillman et al., 2004). Defining the 
success of CPA based exclusively on the passage of firm-friendly policy outcomes is 
problematic because policymaking is inherently complex, and is affected by the actions of 
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competing and allied interest groups (Macher & Mayo, 2012). Similarly, capturing CPA 
value through conventional accounting-based indicators of firm performance may be 
confounded by the lag between CPA implementation and reported firm performance. 
Sometimes this lag is too long to enable clear causal inferences. At other times, it may be 
too short to meaningfully account for the longer-term impacts of political engagement (Lux 
et al., 2011).    
In two of the studies in this dissertation, I evaluate the impact of CPA, as well as 
state behavior, from the perspective of firms’ actual and potential shareholders (i.e. 
investors). I do so through an event study methodology, which assumes that new information 
in the form of unanticipated corporate announcements or exogenous shocks in the firm’s 
political environment has economic consequences for firms, and that these consequences 
are swiftly incorporated by investors into the firm’s share price. The advantages of an event 
study approach are two-fold. First, as providers of capital and bearers of residual risk, 
investors have vested interest in firms and are significantly affected by developments that 
affect their performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Put simply, investor reactions are a suitable 
proxy for firm value because what is good for the firm’s bottom line is also good for 
investors. Second, investor reactions can be measured at any time, making them particularly 
well suited for gauging the net, expected consequences of salient events. Within the CPA 
literature, event studies have thus been used to measure the firm-specific consequences of 
having directors run for political office (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), of engaging 
in ‘covert’ forms of CPA (Werner, 2017), of hosting visits for high-ranking government 
officials (Schuler, Shi, Hoskisson, & Chen, 2017), and of backing winning presidential 
candidates (Knight, 2006).       
 Underlying event studies are important assumptions regarding the manner in which 
investors interpret and react to specific events. While the latter has predominantly been the 
focus of finance scholars (e.g. Malkiel & Fama, 1970), management and sociology scholars 
have been more interested in the cognitive processes underlying investor interpretations of 
new information (Oler, Harrison, & Allen, 2008; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). A promising 
perspective that I rely on in this dissertation is the ‘behavioral perspective of investor 
reactions’ (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). According to this view, investors face information 
asymmetries that prevent them from ascertaining the private incentives of actors whose 
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decisions can ultimately affect their investments. As such, investors will subsequently seek 
signals -i.e. crude, but publicly available pieces of information- that help them mitigate these 
informational asymmetries. I apply this behavioral perspective in two ways. First, I show 
that because investors cannot trust management’s valuation of the added value of CPA ex 
ante (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hadani 2012; Hadani et al., 2017), they will resort to 
supplementary information pertaining to the firm and its institutional context to derive an 
independent judgement of this value. I similarly extend this framework to the level of the 
national government to show that signals can also help investors remedy information 
asymmetries vis-à-vis the incumbent regime in situations where the credibility of the latter 
is questionable. Second, in line with signaling theory (Spence, 1974), I show that 
management themselves can also utilize signals to remedy the informational asymmetries 
between them and important stakeholders, with the aim of eliciting positive stakeholder 
evaluations of the firm. Specifically, I show that certain forms of CPA may be used by 
management to signal their awareness of the community’s grievances against the firm, and 
that they are actively working on remedying these concerns.      
 
1.2.4 Political Uncertainty  
There has been considerable interest among management scholars in the consequences of 
political uncertainty on firms (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Henisz & Delios, 2001, 2004; 
Holburn & Zelner, 2010, Kobrin, 1979), as well as how firms and their stakeholders will 
subsequently respond to such uncertainty (Oetzel & Getz, 2012). Firms face political 
uncertainty because their interests are not always aligned with those of the state, implying 
an ever-present risk of unfavorable regulations being introduced and existing ones amended. 
Policymaking, moreover, is an inherently complex and opaque process such that third parties 
are not always able to fully anticipate specific policy developments (Hadani et al., 2017; 
Hart, 2004). In the context of less developed countries with weak legal institutions, political 
uncertainty additionally manifests itself in the form of low policy credibility since 
unconstrained regimes can readily and unilaterally rescind their earlier commitments to the 
detriment of firms with existing investments (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Firms operating in 
such countries additionally contend with the real possibility of predatory state behavior, such 
as expropriation and forced divestment (Kobrin, 1980).  
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The notion of political uncertainty is closely related to the study of CPA because 
the asymmetric power of the state over business is ultimately what drives firms to actively 
seek to manage their dependence on government. In that regard, relational forms of CPA 
have been shown to provide firms with insider information and influence over the 
development of public policy, thus enabling them to partly mitigate the political uncertainty 
that they face (Wellman, 2017). There are circumstances, however, where CPA is a less 
feasible or less attractive option for firms. For instance, because developing formal and 
informal ties with policymakers is costly and time-consuming, firms may hesitate to adopt 
relational CPA when the regime is unlikely to remain in power for long (e.g. Blanes i Vidal, 
Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012). Because relational CPA is associated with corruption in 
emerging economies (Lawton et al., 2013), firms domiciled or operating there could also 
refrain from CPA to guard their reputational capital from negative stakeholder evaluations 
(Darendeli & Hill, 2016), or to avoid political retribution if a new regime were to abruptly 
displace the current one (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007). Under these 
conditions, it is not clear what firms can do to mitigate political uncertainty, and particularly, 
how else they can tap into valuable political knowledge that is privately held by select 
members of the ruling regime.  
In this dissertation, I study the underexplored context of interim governments in 
emerging economies; a context wherein firms and their stakeholders face asymmetric 
information regarding the interim government’s actual intention to follow through with a 
process of democratic transition in the aftermath of authoritarian regime overthrow. Because 
the potential derailing of democratization amplifies the political uncertainty that firms face, 
I look into how investors attempt to infer the regime’s private political objectives in the 
absence of conventional forms of CPA.                 
 
1.3 Dissertation Overview 
To address the overarching research question of this dissertation, I conducted three empirical 
studies broadly related to how the business-government interface is differentially perceived 
by firms and their stakeholders in two substantially different institutional contexts: across 
14 OECD Members States at relatively high levels of political and economic development, 
and in the interim period in Egypt that succeeded the overthrow of its authoritarian Head of 
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State, Hosni Mubarak. Below, I provide an overview of each study in terms of its (a) central 
topic, (b) outcome, (c) theoretical lens of relevance, (d) research method, (e) unit of analysis, 
(f) sample, and (g) data source(s) used. I conclude with a table that summarizes the research 
gaps in the literature that are addressed by each study and the main contributions made.  
 
1.3.1 Study One: “Politcian Appointments as Strategic Responses to Community-
Based Legitimacy Threats” 
 
The first study of this dissertation moves beyond the generic understanding of CPA in the 
literature wherein firms engage in politics only in response to threats stemming directly from 
their political environment. Instead, the study advances a complementary understanding of 
the antecedents of CPA by drawing on politicians’ roles as ‘community leaders’ to position 
their appointment to the firm as a way to defuse the discontent from secondary stakeholders 
who lack institutionalized access to firm decision-making. Using a unique, hand-compiled 
dataset of all director appointments in the largest 1,063 firms in 14 developed economies 
from 2001 to 2010, the study finds that firms are likely to appoint politicians to the board 
when faced with community-based legitimacy threats, but not in response to shareholder-, 
customer-, or employee-based threats. Politcian appointments as strategic responses to 
community-based legitimacy threats are even more likely when the government is a major 
customer of the firm. Overall, the results of this study contribute to the resource dependence-
theoretic understanding of corporate political activities specifically, and to the 
organizational legitimacy literature more generally. 
 
Table 1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study One  
Topic CPA as a strategic response to community-based discontent 
Outcome Appointment of politicians to the board  
Theoretical lenses Resource dependence theory 
Stakeholder theory 
Varieties of Capitalism 
Method Panel data analysis (Mixed-effects Poisson regression) 
Unit of analysis Firm 
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Sample 4,439 firm-year observations for 1,063 firms across 14 OECD 
Member States (2001-2010) 
Data sources Author-compiled dataset on the political background of board 
members, derived from a variety of sources including BoardEx, 
annual reports, and governmental websites; Asset4; Datastream 
 
1.3.2 Study Two: “Board of Thrones? Unraveling Investor Reactions to Politician 
Appointments” 
 
In the second study, I shift my empirical focus to the consequences of CPA as measured by 
investor reactions to the appointment of politicians onto corporate boards. In response to the 
mixed findings in the literature regarding the value that firms accrue from establishing ties 
with politicians, this study adopts a multi-level, contingency approach that incorporates both 
resource dependence and agency theory to forward a more comprehensive and finer-grained 
understanding of politician appointment value. Specifically, the study argues and shows that 
investors perceive politician appointments as both value-enhancing and value-destroying, 
but that under certain conditions the potential dependence-management benefits of politician 
appointments are expected to outweigh their agency costs, and vice versa. Using event study 
methodology on the appointment of 349 politicians to the boards of 1,063 firms across 14 
OECD countries from 2002 to 2010, the main findings of this study are that: (a) investors 
react positively to the appointment of politicians to financially-dependent but not politically-
dependent firms, (b) the degree of corruption in the country in which the appointment takes 
place amplifies both the dependence management-based benefits and the agency costs that 
politician appointments are expected to generate, (c) investors are largely indifferent to 
politician-specific attributes such as ideology, incumbency, nationality and jurisdictional 
level, when assessing the resource-provisionary capacity of appointed politicians and the 
agency risks that they pose.   
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Table 1.3 Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study Two  
Topic Perceived consequences of CPA 
Outcome Investor reactions to the appointment of politicians to the board 
Theoretical lenses Resource dependence theory 
Agency theory 
Behavioral perspective on investor reactions 
Method Event study with cumulative abnormal returns as dependent 
variable of multivariate regression 
Unit of analysis Politician-appointment events 
Sample 349 politician appointment events among 1,063 firms in 14 OECD 
Member States (2002-2010)  
Data sources Author-compiled dataset on the political background of board 
members, derived from a variety of sources including BoardEx, 
annual reports, and governmental websites; Lexis-Nexis; 
Datastream 
 
1.3.3 Study Three: “Towards a Democratic New Normal?  Investor Reactions to 
Interim-Government Dominance During Spells of Political Violence” 
  
Departing from the developed economy context of the previous two studies, the final study 
of this dissertation zooms in on the interim period in Egypt during the highly turbulent Arab 
Spring. Interim periods are a cornerstone of political transitions: they succeed the collapse 
of an authoritarian regime but precede the establishment of an alternative democratic 
political order. Although interim governments have frequently featured in developing 
countries since the Second World War, the existing literatures on business-government 
relations and political uncertainty have thus far largely overlooked them, focusing instead 
on more conventional forms of government such as democracies and autocracies. During 
interim periods, firms and their investors face a significant information asymmetry vis-à-vis 
the national government since they cannot ascertain the regime’s private commitment to 
democratization. Though investors will seek to remedy their information asymmetry, 
conventional forms of relational CPA are unlikely to be considered an attractive option in 
this context given the supposedly temporary tenure of interim regimes. Drawing on the 
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behavioral perspective of investor reactions, this study argues and shows that investors will 
resort instead to the degree of force used by the interim government against non-
governmental actors during spells of political violence as an informational signal by which 
they can infer the government’s private political objectives. The study finds that higher 
governmental use of force against civilians in the interim period increases the political 
uncertainty that investors face but that firm-level attributes -namely, the firm’s foreign 
footprint and ownership concentration- can mitigate the adverse impact of this uncertainty. 
Altogether, the results of this study contribute to a better understanding of how investors 
perceive and respond to the political uncertainty that the behavior of specific forms of 
government can produce. 
 
Table 1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study Three  
Topic Political uncertainty under interim governments 
Outcome Investor reactions to spells of political violence 
Theoretical lenses Political uncertainty  
Behavioral perspective on investor reactions 
Method Event study with cumulative abnormal returns as dependent 
variable of multivariate regression 
Unit of analysis Spells of political violence 
Sample 94 spells of political violence in post-Mubarak Egypt (2011-
2015); 6,908 firm-spell observations 
Data sources Newspaper articles, Datastream 
 
An important caveat regarding the following three chapters, is that each study was 
envisioned and written independently for the purpose of journal publication. As such, these 
studies may best be understood as stand-alone research articles that individually contribute 
to the overarching theme of this dissertation, as explicated below.   
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Table 1.5 Research Gaps Addressed in Dissertation and Intended Contributions 
Study Gaps in Prior Studies Main Contributions of Study 
1. CPA as a 
strategic response 
to community-
based discontent 
(Chapter 2) 
- Antecedents of CPA that 
transcend the firm’s political 
environment 
- The managerial implications of 
politicians as ‘stakeholder-
directors’ 
 
- Advancing the strategic 
function of politician 
appointments as responses to 
legitimacy threats that emanate 
from the broader public 
- Highlighting the differential 
impact of the state on firms, 
based on its role as regulator vs. 
major customer 
 
2. Investor 
reactions to 
politician 
appointments 
(Chapter 3) 
- The perceived value of politician 
appointments, beyond political 
dependence-management 
- The perceived consequences of 
political overembeddedness 
- The moderating effect of the 
institutional environment on the 
perceived benefits and costs of 
politician appointments  
 
- Documenting the prevalence of 
politician appointments in the 
world’s most developed 
economies   
- Forwarding a multilevel, 
contingency-based approach to 
CPA value that incorporates 
RDT and agency theory, as well 
as the institutional context of 
the firm 
 
3. Political 
uncertainty under 
interim 
governments  
(Chapter 4) 
- The perceived business 
consequences of operating under 
interim governments 
- State behavior during violent 
conflict as a driver of political 
uncertainty 
 
- Identifying a new source of 
political uncertainty for 
investors: uncertainty stemming 
from an interim government’s 
perceived unwillingness to fulfil 
its democratic mandate 
- Demonstrating that violence has 
informational value: investors 
do not assess the consequences 
of violent conflict based solely 
on severity, but also by the 
regime’s show of force  
- Uncovering firm-level attributes 
that determine organizational 
vulnerability to the adverse 
effects of political uncertainty    
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SUMMARY 
In their pursuit of competitive advantage, firms will sometimes resort to the political domain 
in search of opportunities to advance and secure their economic interests. While academic 
interest in the business-government interface has seen remarkable growth in recent years, 
there remain important gaps in the existing body of knowledge as to why, when, and how 
firms will engage with the government in different institutional contexts. In this dissertation, 
I supplement the extant resource-dependence understanding of business-government 
relations with other theoretical lenses to answer the following questions: (1) what are the 
antecedents of corporate political activity (CPA) that transcend the firm’s direct political 
dependencies? (2) what are the firm- and country-specific conditions that jointly determine 
the expected benefits and costs of CPA? and (3) how do firms and their stakeholders cope 
with political uncertainty in circumstances wherein conventional forms of CPA are not 
readily available?  
 In two studies of this dissertation I focus on one particular type of CPA: the 
appointment of current and former politicians on firms’ boards of directors. Using 14 OECD 
Member States as my empirical context, I find, first, that politcian appointments are 
prevalent even among the world’s most economically-developed economies. Nonetheless, 
important differences do exist across these countries in terms of the expected firm-value to 
be derived from CPA. Specifically, I find that the degree of perceived corruption in a country 
increases both the benefits to the firm of being politically connected, but also the agency-
based risks of being too politically connected. Second, I find that prior studies may have 
inadvertently overlooked the broader implications of politician appointments by 
conceptualizing CPA as a dependence-management strategy that is exclusive to the firm’s 
political environment. Specifically, findings of this dissertation suggest that CPA can 
additionally be employed to help firms attain and secure relational capital from a broader 
set of non-political stakeholders, including financiers and members of the public.    
 In the final study, I examine a substantively different context—namely, the 
transitional period that succeeds the collapse of an authoritarian regime in a developing 
country, but precedes the establishment of a democratic alternative. In doing so, the study 
sheds light on a form of government that has thus far gone unexamined in the literature on 
the business-government interface: interim governments. Combining a behavioral view of 
investor reactions with insights from the political science literature on civil conflict, I 
forward a new perspective on how investors remedy the information asymmetry that exists 
between them and interim governments, without necessarily having to resort to CPA. 
Importantly, the study identifies a new source of political uncertainty that governments in 
institutionally less-developed countries can pose to firms and their stakeholders. 
 Taken together, the findings of this dissertation demonstrate promising 
opportunities for multi-level, inter-theoretic, and inter-disciplinary research on CPA and the 
business-government interface. In today’s increasingly politicized business environment, 
research of this kind is ever more important for business and society alike.                
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
In hun streven naar een concurrentievoordeel nemen bedrijven met enige regelmaat hun 
toevlucht tot het politieke domein, op zoek naar mogelijkheden om hun economische 
belangen te bevorderen en veilig te stellen. Hoewel de academische interesse in het raakvlak 
tussen bedrijven en de overheid de afgelopen jaren opmerkelijk is gegroeid, blijven er 
belangrijke hiaten bestaan in de bestaande kennis over waarom, wanneer en hoe bedrijven 
en de overheid in verschillende institutionele contexten met elkaar om zullen omgaan. In dit 
proefschrift vul ik de bestaande resource-afhankelijkheidsconceptie van zakelijke relaties 
tussen bedrijven en overheid aan met andere theoretische invalshoeken om de volgende 
vragen te beantwoorden: (1) wat zijn de antecedenten van bedrijfspolitieke activiteit 
(‘Corporate Political Activity’, hierna afgekort als CPA) die de directe politieke 
afhankelijkheden van de onderneming overstijgen? (2) wat zijn de bedrijfs- en land 
specifieke voorwaarden die gezamenlijk de verwachte voordelen en risico’s van CPA 
bepalen? en (3) hoe kunnen bedrijven en hun stakeholders omgaan met politieke 
onzekerheid in omstandigheden waarin conventionele vormen van CPA niet direct 
beschikbaar zijn? 
In twee studies van dit proefschrift richt ik me op een bepaald type CPA: de 
benoeming van huidige en voormalige politici in de raden van bestuur van bedrijven. Als ik 
de 14 OESO-lidstaten als mijn empirische context beschouw, constateer ik ten eerste dat 
politieke benoemingen voorkomen in zelfs de meest economisch ontwikkelde economieën 
van de wereld. Desalniettemin bestaan er in deze landen belangrijke verschillen wat betreft 
de verwachte waarde voor het bedrijf die uit de CPA voortkomen. Concreet laten de 
resultaten van mijn onderzoek zien dat de mate van waargenomen corruptie in een land de 
voordelen voor bedrijven om politiek verbonden te zijn vergroot, maar ook als risico heeft 
te politiek verbonden te zijn. 
Ten tweede merk ik op dat eerdere studies onopzettelijk de bredere implicaties van 
afspraken met politici over het hoofd hebben gezien door CPA te conceptualiseren als een 
strategie voor afhankelijkheidsmanagement die exclusief is voor de politieke omgeving van 
het bedrijf. Specifiek suggereren de bevindingen van dit proefschrift dat CPA bovendien 
kan worden gebruikt om bedrijven te helpen bij het bereiken en veiligstellen van relationeel 
kapitaal van een bredere verzameling niet-politieke belanghebbenden, waaronder 
investeerders en het algemeen publiek. 
In de laatste studie onderzoek ik een inhoudelijk andere context - namelijk de 
overgangsperiode die volgt op de afzetting van een autoritair regime in een 
ontwikkelingsland, en voorafgaat aan de oprichting van een democratisch alternatief. 
Hiermee werpt de studie een licht op een vorm van bestuur die tot nu toe niet is onderzocht 
in de literatuur over de relatie tussen bedrijfsleven en overheid: interim-regeringen. Door 
een gedragsmatige kijk op reacties van beleggers te combineren met inzichten uit de 
politieke-wetenschappelijke literatuur over burgerconflicten, bied ik een nieuw perspectief 
op hoe beleggers de informatie-asymmetrie tussen hen en interim-regeringen verhelpen, 
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zonder noodzakelijkerwijs hun toevlucht te nemen tot CPA. Belangrijk is dat de studie een 
nieuwe bron van politieke onzekerheid identificeert die overheden in minder ontwikkelde 
landen kunnen vormen voor bedrijven en hun aandeelhouders. 
Samengevat tonen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift veelbelovende 
mogelijkheden voor multi-level, inter-theoretisch en interdisciplinair onderzoek naar CPA 
en de interface tussen bedrijfsleven en overheid. In de steeds meer gepolitiseerde 
bedrijfsomgeving van vandaag de dag is dit soort onderzoek steeds belangrijker voor zowel 
het bedrijfsleven als de samenleving in het algemeen. 
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El Nayal, O., van Oosterhout, J. & van Essen, M. “Board of Thrones? Unraveling 
Investor Reactions to Politician Appointments” 
 
El Nayal, O., van Essen, M., Slangen, A. & van Oosterhout, J. “Towards a 
Democratic New Normal? Investor Reactions to Interim-Government Dominance 
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PhD and M.Phil. courses 
 
Advanced Panel Data Econometrics 
Behavioral Decision Theory 
Behavioral Foundations 
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Corporate Developments 
Corporate Governance 
Economic Foundations 
Economics of Entrepreneurship 
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Meta-Analysis: Beyond Data Synthesis 
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Treatment Effects Analysis  
Web-Based and Mobile Survey Research 
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The ERIM PhD Series 
 
The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management 
defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated 
to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM 
PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of 
Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus University 
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Almeida e Santos Nogueira, R.J. de, Conditional Density Models Integrating Fuzzy and 
Probabilistic Representations of Uncertainty, Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak &  
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Depecik, B.E., Revitalizing brands and brand: Essays on Brand and Brand Portfolio 
Management Strategies, Promotors: Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, Dr Y.M. van Everdingen  
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